The agreement calls on the signatories to “deliberate together on the measures necessary to fulfil the common responsibilities defined in this declaration.” During the discussions on Yalta, Molotov added language that weakens the implication of the application of the declaration.  45, paragraph 4 of the Moscow Declaration and Article 106 of the United Nations Charter provided for the four allied nations to consult and take “common measures” on behalf of the international community. Article 103 stipulated that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of members of the Organization and their obligations under an international agreement, their obligations to the Charter of the United Nations should prevail. Meeting Truman Molotov 29 July 45; FRUS: Potsdam, volume 2, 476; Byrnes, Open Speech, 207-208; J.F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper, 1958), 297-298; Leahy Diary, July 29, 45, 133; Robert J.C. Butov, Japan`s Decision to Surrender (Stanford University Press, 1954), 156-157. Molotov`s request to invite the Allies to join the war is excluded from the Soviet version of the Protocol of the Potsdam Conference, cf. Berlinskaia conferentsiia, 234-243. The final agreement stipulated that “the provisional government currently working in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis, including Polish and Polish democratic leaders abroad.”  Yalta`s language recognized the supremacy of the pro-Soviet Lublin government in a provisional government, albeit a reorganized one.  6 After the victory of the Battle of Stalingrad, however, Stalin began seriously to prepare for war against Japan. He ordered the NKVD to build a new railway line from Komsomolsk-na-Amure to Sovetskaia Gavan`, on the Pacific coast. At the Foreign Ministers` Conference in Moscow and at the Tehran Conference in October 1943, he promised to enter the war against Japan after the capitulation of Germany, a promise made to obtain Allied approval for the opening of a second front in Europe.
He intended to obtain against Japan for geopolitical interests, regardless of the position of the Allies, but he managed to sell this request as if it were his concession to the Allies. At the conference, he made it clear that in due course he would announce his “desiderata” for Soviet accession to the Pacific War.8 56Stalin also played on the Chinese response. He expected that the Soviet advance deep in Manchuria would prompt the Chinese to make concessions, lest Soviet influence in Manchuria lead to the establishment of a communist regime in Manchuria. He won the game. The Chinese finally reached an agreement on 15 August, three hours after Japan announced its unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam terms.65 I must honestly admit that, given what we knew about Soviet actions in East Germany and the violations of the Yalta agreements in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, I would have been satisfied if the Russians had been determined not to enter the war.